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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine police approaching and asking questions of a person suspected
of murdering a mentally disabled child. Assume that the suspect voluntarily
responds to the officers' questions and confesses to the gruesome crime. At
that point, she is read her Miranda warnings and again voluntarily confesses.
The first confession, made before the suspect had been advised of her rights
as required by Miranda v. Arizona' is generally inadmissible.2 Under what
circumstances should she also be saved from her second statement, made
only after she was aware of her rights? This was essentially the question
posed to the Supreme Court in Missouri v. Seibert,3 and the answer depends
on which Justice you ask.
According to four Justices, such a statement is admissible only if, after
applying an amorphous multi-factor test, the Miranda warnings could still
serve their purpose.4 Four other Justices would admit the second confession
because both of the suspect's statements were in fact "voluntary" under
established precedent.5 The remaining Justice, whose view might be the
most important of all, would admit the statement as long as police did not
"deliberately" fail to deliver a Miranda warning to the suspect at the outset.
Confused? So are many of the lower courts that have tried to glean the
proper rule from this case and apply it.
1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2. See id.; Missouri v. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. 2601, 2605 (2004) (plurality opinion).
3. 124 S. Ct. at 2601.
4. See Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2609-13 (plurality opinion).
5. See id. at 2616 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
6. See id. at 2614-16 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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This case note first briefly and generally examines the history,
beginning in England, of the present-day Fifth Amendment right against self
incrimination. In particular, it traces the development of the right in the
custodial interrogation context from Miranda v. Arizona,7 to the successive
confession case of Oregon v. Elstad, ' to the split in the circuits that
followed. Part III analyzes in some detail the Court's recent decision in
Missouri v. Seibert, 9 with an emphasis on distinguishing between the
approaches taken by the plurality, concurring, and the dissenting Justices.
This section also discusses some of the highlights and criticisms of the
approaches advocated in each opinion. In part IV, this note examines cases
applying Seibert to illustrate its impact on lower courts thus far, and those
courts' attempts to formulate a workable rule. The article concludes by
evaluating the potential impact on law enforcement and the actual impact of
the ruling on the person described in the opening, Patrice Seibert.
II. THE BACKDROP TO SEIBERTr AN OVERVIEW OF THE RIGHT' 0 AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMINATION
A. Confessions and Self-Incrimination Law Prior to Miranda v. Arizona
Like many American legal traditions, our modem day right against self-
incrimination has its roots in English jurisprudence. " Much has been
written about the history and policy behind this right, and detailed treatment
of such issues is beyond the scope of this case note. 12 However, it is
interesting to note that the establishment of the right is often traced to
Englishman John Lilbume, " who refused to incriminate himself in
7. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
8. 470 U.S. 298 (1984).
9. 124 S. Ct. at 2601.
10. Although some refer to the right against self incrimination as a "privilege," it is better viewed
as a right because it is guaranteed by the Constitution. LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT: THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION vii (1968).
11. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 459; see also MARK BERGER, TAKING THE FIFTH: THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 1-20 (1980) (providing the historical
framework for the creation of the Fifth Amendment).
12. For a well respected discussion of these issues see LEVY, supra note 10, and BERGER, supra
note 11, at 1-23.
13. Justice Warren spelled the name "Lilbum" in his majority opinion in Miranda, but Professors
Berger and Levy spell the name "Lilbume." See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 459; LEVY, supra note 10, at
271; BERGER, supra note 11, at 16.
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proceedings during the early Seventeenth Century. 14 At least partly as a
result of Lilburne's persistence, the right became widely recognized across
England, and by the Nineteenth Century, common law courts had extended it
to include a right to remain silent during interrogation."
This trend undoubtedly influenced colonial America as evidenced by the
number of states that adopted the right in their constitutions and the fact that
the First United States Congress included the protection in the Bill of
Rights. 16 The right appears in the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and guarantees that no person be forced to speak "unless he
chooses to.. . in the unfettered exercise of his own will."' 7 Case law has
since interpreted that right to include the right to remain silent during
custodial interrogation. 18 Although the seeds of self-incrimination law were
imported from the other side of the Atlantic, they took hold in America and
thrived as more and more courts recognized that "'[t]he quality of a nation's
civilization can be largely measured by the methods it uses in the
enforcement of its criminal law."' 9 Courts also sought to firmly establish the
right because, from a policy perspective, they recognized that the reliability
of coerced confessions is suspect and there is a "deep-rooted feeling that the
police must obey the law while enforcing the law.'
20
Practically speaking, prior to the Court's landmark decision in Miranda
v. Arizona in 1966, the Court analyzed confessions under the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment with the goal of excluding statements
14. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 459. Interestingly, Miranda also noted that the privilege may have
existed during Biblical times. See id. at 458 n.27; see also BERGER, supra note 11, at 15 (noting that
"history quite appropriately recognizes Lilburne's service as a special catalyst in the movement to
abolish the oath"). Although the court eventually recognized that Lilburne could not be forced to
incriminate himself, it did not do so until he had completed a lengthy contempt sentence. BERGER,
supra note 11, at 18-19.
15. See Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897); see also BERGER, supra note 11, at 21
(noting the effect of the post-Lilburne era on the legal system of the American colonies).
16. BERGER, supra note 11, at 22-23. Concerning inclusion of the right in the Constitution, Chief
Justice Earl Warren eloquently explained that "[t]he privilege against self-incrimination is a right
that was hard-earned by our forefathers. The reasons for its inclusion in the Constitution-and the
necessities for its preservation-are to be found in the lessons of history." Quinn v. United States,
349 U.S. 155, 161 (1955).
17. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964); see U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person... shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself .... ).
18. See Malloy, 378 U.S. at 8. The right was considered to be so important that it was codified in
the Nineteenth Century: "You are not obliged to say anything unless you desire to do so, but
whatever you say will be taken down in writing, and may be given in evidence against you." See
Bram, 168 U.S. at 550.
19. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 480 (quoting Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal
Procedure, 70 HARv. L. REV. 1, 26 (1956)).
20. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320-21 (1959).
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obtained by measures "revolting to the sense of justice. ' '21 The focal point of
this approach, often referred to as the "due process voluntariness test," was
whether the statement was voluntarily made.22 In applying this test, courts
considered a confession voluntary if, under a totality of the circumstances, it
was "the product of a rational intellect and a free will '23 and the police had
not overborne the free will of the suspect.24
This "due process voluntariness test" prevailed from 1936 when the
Court decided Brown v. Mississippi25 until the Miranda decision in 1966.26
Over the course of the thirty years that it applied the voluntariness test, the
Court began to recognize some of its shortcomings, most significantly its
inability to provide clear guidance for lower courts and law enforcement.27
In addition, particularly troubling to the Warren Court was the fear that the
voluntariness test was not effective in regulating coercive interrogation
28tactics.
Reflecting these concerns, the Warren Court set the stage for a sweeping
change two years prior to Miranda by deciding two cases involving the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 29 Although both cases involved the right
to counsel, they were relevant because prior to the first case, Massiah v.
21. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936). In Brown, the police coercion in eliciting
statements was particularly extreme, involving the whipping and hanging of defendants. Id. at 281-
83.
22. See Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513-14 (1963); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560
(1958); Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547 (1942); see also KENNETH W. STARR, FIRST AMONG EQUALS
192 (2002) (emphasizing that the key inquiry was "whether the defendant had been forced to
incriminate himself').
23. Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 208 (1960). In Blackburn, the Court considered both
physical intimidation and psychological pressure to be prohibited. Id. at 206.
24. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 544 (1961); see also Haynes, 373 U.S. at 513-14
(applying a totality of the circumstances test).
25. 297 U.S. at 278.
26. Karen S. DesRoches, Comment, Whither Went Miranda?, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1229,
1231 (1986); see also BERGER, supra note 11, at 125-26 (explaining the development of confession
law from Brown to Miranda).
27. STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 621 (6th
ed. 2000) (noting that "[tihe word voluntary... had to be defined anew in every case"); see also
Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 138 (1954) (Clark, J., concurring) ("[T]he practical result of this
ad hoc approach is simply that when five Justices are sufficiently revolted by local police action, a
conviction is overturned ... ").
28. WELSH S. WHITE, MIRANDA'S WANING PROTECTIONS: POLICE INTERROGATION PRACTICES
AFTER DICKERSON 48 (2001) (emphasizing that "the due process test could not completely
eliminate" torture and extreme abuses because "lower courts were unwilling to credit suspects'
truthful testimony relating to abusive interrogation practices.").
29. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478
(1964).
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United States,30 deprivation of counsel was considered as part of the broader
totality of the circumstances under the due process voluntariness test. 31 But
in those cases, the Court shifted gears by holding that violations of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel required suppression of both pre-indictment
32
and post-indictment 33 statements. 34 In making this change, the Court
foreshadowed "that the right to remain silent arose from the privilege against
self-incrimination secured by the [F]ifth [A]mendment.
'35
B. A Sweeping Change: The Miranda Decision
In Miranda v. Arizona,36 the Supreme Court recognized by a five-to-four
margin that custodial interrogation is inherently coercive and that the
accused must be apprised of his or her Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights,
including the right to remain silent, before any police interrogation. 37 The
immediate effect of this case on the judiciary was that it signaled the end of
the voluntariness analysis. And for Ernesto Miranda, the adoption of a new
standard was a gift from the High Court because under the prior standard
"there was no doubt that Miranda's confession would have been
admissible. 38
More importantly in the broader context of criminal justice, Miranda
announced an easy-to-apply, if not controversial, test that required law
enforcement to read a set of warnings, which included the right to remain
silent, prior to custodial interrogation. 39  By creating this test, the Court
30. 377U.S.at201.
31. See, e.g., Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 438-41 (1958), overruled by Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
32. Escobedo, 378 U.S. at490-91.
33. Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206.
34. Id.; Escobedo, 378 U.S. at490-91.
35. Bettie E. Goldman, Note, Oregon v. Elstad: Boldly Stepping Backwards to Pre-Miranda
Days, 35 CATH. U. L. REV. 245,251 (1985).
36. 384 U.S. at 436.
37. Id. at 478-79. The Court emphasized the coercive nature of custodial interrogation by stating
"custodial interrogation exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty and trades on the weakness of
individuals." Id. at 455. Although the Miranda decision stands as a stark turning point in Supreme
Court jurisprudence, the decision did not come as a complete surprise. See WHITE, supra note 28, at
48. In fact, prior to Miranda, the Court's increased concerns about suspects' rights signaled that
such a change was on the horizon. Id. ("As the Court's sensitivity to the psychological impact of
custodial interrogation practices expanded, its concern for regulating interrogation tactics...
increased."). While the Court's willingness to adopt a different standard can primarily be explained
by those concerns, the petitioners' proposals likely played at least some role. See LIVA BAKER,
MIRANDA: CRIME, LAW AND POLITICS 137 (1983).
38. STARR, supra note 22, at 192. Starr explains that "the police in Miranda had not engaged in
the kind of heavy-handed methods that in many cases had led courts to conclude that the confessions
received had indeed been 'coerced."' Id.
39. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444; BERGER, supra note 11, at 130 (noting that "criticism burst forth
after the Miranda ruling was handed down"). One reason the test was controversial is illustrated by
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expressly extended the Fifth Amendment right against self incrimination
beyond the courtroom to include custodial interrogations as well. 4 The
Court further held that confessions obtained without Miranda warnings or a
valid waiver of the warnings could not be admitted against a defendant at
trial.4 1 Although exceptions to Miranda were necessarily created over time,
42the test remains a fixture of the criminal justice system.
It seems clear that the Court's goal in Miranda to create a bright line test
was successful. But while the Court then recognized the need to establish
"concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts
to follow," the Court now must address new challenges to Miranda such as
the ones posed by the law enforcement tactics present in Missouri v.
Seibert.43  Nonetheless, Miranda is recognized as the Warren Court's
landmark criminal law decision and remains good law today.44 In fact, its
language has become such a part of our nation's psyche that "children are
more likely to recognize the Miranda warnings than the Gettysburg
Address. '4 5
the fact that Miranda's statements were excluded. In fact, the Miranda standard does require
suppression of many statements that would have been admissible under the voluntariness analysis.
See, e.g., Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 305 (1985).
With regard to specific warnings required by the Court, it said that "[p]rior to any
questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he
does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an
attorney." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. In adopting this language, the Court seemed to draw on the
petitioner's statement at oral argument. See BAKER, supra note 37, at 137.
40. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460-61. Many commentators agree that Miranda extended "the
law far beyond the familiar text of the Fifth Amendment." STARR, supra note 22, at 191.
41. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478-79. The Court provided that a defendant could waive the rights
guaranteed under Miranda, as long as the waiver was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made.
See id. at 444.
42. See, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 651 (1984) (recognizing an exception to
Miranda if public safety is compromised by strict compliance with the warnings); Harris v. New
York, 401 U.S. 222, 224-26 (1971) (holding that although statements made pre-Miranda cannot be
used in the prosecution's case in chief, they can be used to impeach).
43. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 442; accord Missouri v. Seibert 124 S. Ct. 2601 (2004).
44. See, e.g., Richard A. Leo, Questioning the Relevance of Miranda in the Twenty-First
Century, 99 MICH. L. REv. 1000, 1001 (2001).
45. THE MIRANDA DEBATE: LAW, JUSTICE, AND POLICING xv (Richard A. Leo & George C.
Thomas III eds., 1998); see also Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) (emphasizing
that Miranda is so "embedded in routine police practice" that it has "become part of our national
culture").
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C. Self-Incrimination Law and Two-Step Interrogations Prior to Seibert
1. Oregon v. Elstad
In the decades following, Miranda the Supreme Court was called on
often to interpret Miranda's requirements in different contexts. One such
case was Oregon v. Elstad,46 where the Court addressed the same broad
issue faced in Seibert: whether a suspect's second confession was admissible
despite the fact that the first confession lacked Miranda warnings. 47 In
Elstad, police officers went to the home of James Elstad to arrest him in
connection with a burglary.4 8 While escorting Elstad from his home, one
officer asked a question relating to the crime, prior to reading Miranda
warnings, and Elstad responded with an incriminating statement.49 He was
then transported to the police station where he was given Miranda warnings
one hour later.5 o Elstad executed a waiver of his Miranda rights and
confessed a second time.5'
Writing for a six-member majority, Justice O'Connor announced a
voluntariness standard for evaluating uncoerced confessions elicited from
"two-step" interrogation procedures. 52 Under that test, if the unwarned
statement is not coerced, and therefore voluntary under the Fifth
Amendment, the second confession will be admitted as long as it is
voluntarily made. 53 In other words, if both pre-warning and post-warning
statements are voluntarily made, a "simple failure" to administer Miranda
warnings will not affect the admissibility of the warned statement.54 On the
issue of voluntariness, the Court noted that the act of simply reciting
Miranda warnings is generally enough to ensure that the second, warned
statement is in fact voluntary.55 In sum, "[a] subsequent administration of
Miranda warnings to a suspect who has given a voluntary but unwarned
46. 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
47. See id. at 300. The key difference is that Elstad involved a good-faith Miranda violation
while in Seibert the Court was faced with an intentional violation. See infra Part III.A.
48. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 300-02.
49. Id. Specifically, the officer told Elstad that he suspected that Elstad was responsible for the
burglary, and Elstad replied, "Yes, I was there." Id. at 301. Whether Elstad was in custody or not
when he made the incriminating statement was not an issue because the state conceded that he was.
Id. at 302.
50. Id. at 301.
51. Id. at301-02.
52. Id. at 309. Chief Justice Burger, and Justices White, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist
joined in the majority opinion. Id. at 299.
53. Id. at 309 ("[T]he admissibility of any subsequent statement should turn... solely on
whether it is knowingly and voluntarily made.").
54. Id.
55. Id. at 314.
[Vol. 33: 423, 2006] You Have the Right to Remain Silent.
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
statement ordinarily should suffice to remove the conditions that precluded
admission of the earlier statement. 56 Applying its test to Elstad, the Court
found that the suspect's unwarned statements were not unconstitutionally
coerced, and were therefore voluntary.57 In considering the second part of
the test, the Court also found the warned confession to be voluntary and
therefore admissible.58
One aspect of Justice O'Connor's opinion that has carried over to
subsequent cases, including Seibert, is her rejection of the fruit of the
poisonous tree analysis in the successive confession context.59 In favoring
the voluntariness approach, Justice O'Connor concluded that the fruits
analysis does not operate in the Miranda context as it does with the Fourth
Amendment.6 ° She reasoned that a violation of the Fourth Amendment,
which triggered use of the fruits analysis, was a constitutional violation, but
a violation of Miranda was not.61 The Court clarified that "Miranda ...
sweeps more broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself... [and] may be
triggered even in the absence of a Fifth Amendment violation., 62 This part
of the opinion apparently remains in force despite the fact that the Court
recently held in Dickerson v. United States that Miranda warnings are
constitutionally required.63  Interestingly, the Court in Dickerson did not
question Elstad's refusal to apply the fruit of the poisonous tree analysis and
noted that "[o]ur decision in [Elstad] ... simply recognizes the fact that
unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment are different from
unwarned interrogation under the Fifth Amendment."'64
56. Id.
57. Id. at 314-16.
58. See id.
59. Id. at 306-09. She retained this view in Seibert. See discussion infra Part III.F. In essence,
the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine requires the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence, unless
the "taint" of illegality can be purged. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-89 (1963).
The Court in Wong Sun elaborated that the focal point of the analysis is whether the illegally
obtained evidence "has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means
sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint." 1d. at 488 (quoting JOHN
MACARTHUR MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT: RESTRICTIONS UPON ITS DISCOVERY OR
COMPULSORY DISCLOSURE 221 (1959)).
60. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 306-09.
61. Id. at 305-06. "(Elstad's] contention that his confession was tainted by the earlier failure of
the police to provide Miranda warnings and must be excluded as 'fruit of the poisonous tree'
assumes the existence of a constitutional violation." Id. at 305.
62. Id. at 306.
63. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
64. Id. at 441. All members of the Court in Seibert, save Justice Breyer, agreed that the fruit of
the poisonous tree analysis should not apply in that case. See discussion infra Part III.
The Elstad Court's rejection of the fruit of the poisonous tree analysis
was not absolute, as O'Connor conceded that the fruits analysis was
appropriate in cases where the unwarned statement was involuntary as a
result of unconstitutional coercion.65 In addition to not being absolute, the
majority's rejection of the fruits analysis, in most circumstances, was not
unanimous. Justices Brennan and Marshall, who joined in a dissenting
opinion, endorsed the fruits analysis and felt that the majority's refusal to
apply the fruits analysis had "deliver[ed] a potentially crippling blow to
Miranda."6 6
In fact, Justice Brennan disagreed with virtually every conclusion
reached by the majority. 67 For example, in his view, a confession elicited in
violation of Miranda should create a presumption that the second statement
was involuntary.68 He would have applied a set of factors similar to those
announced in Seibert to determine whether the warned statement should be
admitted. 69 After it was decided, Elstad received criticism from those
apparently agreeing with Justice Brennan's grim prediction about its
detrimental effect on Miranda and on suspects' rights. The primary
complaint was Elstad's potential to undermine Miranda's purpose and
clarity.7° According to one critic: "Instead of recognizing the limitations of
the judicial process or promoting judicial economy, Elstad sacrifices the
precision of Miranda and promises once again to sink lower courts in a mire
of inquiries into voluntariness."'" One effect of the discontent following
65. SeeElstad, 470 U.S. at 309.
66. Id. at 319 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan would have applied the fruit of the
poisonous tree analysis because in his view the Fifth Amendment requires that police give Miranda
warnings, and therefore a failure to give Miranda warnings was a constitutional violation that should
be subject to the fruits analysis. See id. at 347-49. Although the view that Miranda is
constitutionally required was subsequently adopted by the Court in Dickerson, the Justices in Seibert
nonetheless soundly rejected the fruits analysis by an 8-1 margin with only Justice Breyer endorsing
the test. See Missouri v. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. 2601 (2004).
67. See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 319-21 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
68. See id. at 335.
69. See id. at 339-41. Justice Brennan would have considered whether there was a significant
lapse in time between the confessions, whether they took place in the same location, and whether the
suspect was informed that the unwarned statement could not be used against him. See id. All three
of these factors are "Seibert factors." See Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2612 (plurality opinion).
70. See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 35, at 275-77 (criticizing Elstad as "depart[ing] from the
underlying values of both Miranda and the fifth amendment," creating an incentive for police
misconduct, and eliminating Miranda's bright-line rule in these kinds of cases); Claudia R. Barbieri,
Oregon v. Elstad Revisited: Urging State Court Judges to Depart From The U.S. Supreme Court's
Narrowing of Miranda, 4 UDC/DCSL L. REv. 63, 67 (1998) ("Several scholars agree with Justice
Brennan and accuse the Court of dramatically narrowing Miranda's original intent almost to the
point of non-existence.").
71. Leading Cases, Right Against Self-Incrimination--Consecutive Confessions, 99 HARv. L.
REv. 141, 147 (1985). The article goes on to state that "judicial inquiries into the voluntariness of
confessions are both time-consuming and imprecise." Id. at 146. But see United States v. Carter,
432
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Elstad was that some state courts chose to interpret their state constitutions
as being inconsistent with Elstad because they provided more protection for
suspects.72 The result is that those states essentially rejected Elstad in favor
of their own test for admissibility, with some bearing a resemblance to the
approach taken in Seibert.73
2. In the Wake of Elstad, a Split in the Circuits Emerged
Certiorari was granted in Seibert to resolve a split among the circuits.74
The split reflected disagreement between courts over how to treat cases
where police intentionally failed to give Miranda warnings to suspects,
something the Elstad Court was not faced with.7" Eventually, two primary
approaches emerged and examples of each are discussed in turn. In United
States v. Carter6 the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed a
district court decision to suppress a confession in a two-stage interrogation
case. 77 The court cited Elstad for two rules. First, that "[i]f the unwarned
statement is voluntary, then a subsequent warned confession may be
admissible if the prior statement is not the result of 'deliberately coercive or
improper tactics. ' ,, 78 And second, that the subsequent, warned statement
884 F.2d 368, 374 (8th Cir. 1989) (providing an example of a case that limits Elstad in order to
avoid the undesirable effects discussed above).
72. Barbieri, supra note 70, at 64. State supreme courts are allowed to interpret their own
constitutions as providing more protection against law enforcement activity than the Federal
Constitution as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. See id. (citing Michigan v. Long,
463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975)). For a discussion of the
approach taken by one state, see Katherine E. McMahon, "Cat-Out-of-the-Bag" & "Break-in-the-
Stream-of-Events ": Massachusetts' Rejection of Oregon v. Elstad for Suppression of Warned
Statements Made After a Miranda Violation, 20 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 173 (1998) (critiquing that
state's attempts to reject the Court's holding in Elstad). For an example of an approach taken by
another state, see infra note 170.
Although several states including Massachusetts, Tennessee, and Hawaii have interpreted
their own constitutions as rejecting the Elstad rationale, most states have followed Elstad. Barbieri,
supra note 70, at 69-72.
73. See infra note 170.
74. Seibert 124 S. Ct. at 2607.
75. See infra notes 76-130 and accompanying text.
76. 884 F.2d at 368.
77. See id. at 372-75. In Carter, the suspect was questioned by postal investigators in his boss'
office where he made incriminating statements prior to being read Miranda warnings. Id. at 369.
78. Id. at 372 (quoting Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 314 (1985)). The court's discussion of
Elstad is apparently dicta since it held that, in the alternative, the confession was the fruit of an
unconstitutional search. Id. at 374; see also United States v. Esquilin, 208 F.3d 315, 320 (1st Cir.
2000) (commenting that this part of the Carter opinion is dicta), overruled in part by Seibert, 124 S.
Ct. at 2601. The court in Carter also noted that an Elstad defense was apparently not raised at trial,
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must also be voluntary in order to be admissible.79 The court dismissed the
first rule by assuming arguendo that Carter's first confession was
voluntary.8 ° The more important issue was whether the second, warned
statement was voluntary, and the court attempted to distinguish Elstad on its
facts.8
In distinguishing the cases, the court focused on the issue of the time
elapsed between the warned and unwamed statements.82 It emphasized that
"Elstad seemed chiefly concerned by the notion that a suspect is incapable
of making a 'subsequent voluntary and informed waiver.., for some
indefinite period' once Miranda has been violated., 83 In Elstad, the warned
and unwarned statements were about one hour apart, but the interrogation in
Carter was continuous, with no break between the unwarned confession and
the warned confession. 84  So the court considered the second, warned
confession to be "part and parcel" of the first and, as a result, involuntary
under Elstad
Although the court emphasized the timing issue, the court's underlying
concern seemed to be the intentional nature of the Miranda violation.8 6 The
court concluded that the officer's approach to "'get[ting] practically all that
you want out of a person before you ever give them the Miranda rights'
should not be allowed.87 It concluded that "Elstad did not go so far as to
fashion a rule permitting this sort of end run around Miranda" and refused to
admit the post-warning statements.88 From a judicial economy perspective,
the court aptly noted that admitting the statement in Carter could promote
further intentional Miranda violations and require courts to analyze, under
Elstad, whether statements are voluntary or not, an analysis that Miranda
was created to replace. 89 By refusing to admit the statement in Carter, the
court hoped to send a message to police that such deliberate Miranda
but it did not address this issue because it held that under Elstad the second confession was not
admissible. See Carter, 884 F.2d at 372.
79. Carter, 884 F.2d at 372-73.
80. Id. at 373.
81. See id.
82. See id. at 373-74.
83. Id. at 373 (quoting Elstad, 470 U.S. at 309).
84. See id. at 373.
85. See id.
86. See id.
87. Id. (citation omitted).
88. Id. One dissenting judge thought that Carter was not in custody when the statements were
elicited but would have nonetheless found this case indistinguishable from Elstad. Id. at 376 (Beam,
J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 374 (majority opinion) ("If the police are permitted ... to ignore Miranda until after
they obtain a confession, the courts will once again be embroiled in the endless case-by-case
voluntariness inquiries Miranda was designed to prevent, and the ease-of application rationale
enunciated by the Supreme Court will be largely nullified.").
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violations are not beneficial. 90 And as a result, the court intended not only to
protect the rights of the accused, but also to perform fewer Elstad analyses,
which involve difficult voluntariness evaluations.91
Another case applying a similar rationale was United States v. Gale,9
where the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ruled that a
subsequent, warned statement was admissible. 9' Although the court
construed Elstad in the same manner as the court in Carter, it distinguished
Carter's facts.94 And in contrast to Carter, the court ultimately held that,
under Elstad, the warned statement was voluntarily made and there was no
evidence that the prior statements were coerced.95
Unlike Carter, the key issue in Gale was whether the pre-warning
statement was voluntary.96 In concluding that it was, the court rejected the
argument that Gale's unwarned statements were coerced because he was
"faced with a police presence 'that was intimidating and inherently
coercive.' 97 The court responded by noting that custodial interrogation by
its nature is somewhat coercive but that Elstad requires "'actual coercion or
other circumstances calculated to undermine the suspect's ability to exercise
his free will."' 98 And because the district court found no "deliberate police
tactics" of this type, the pre-warning statement was not violative of Elstad.99
The court went on to distinguish Carter on the issue of whether the post-
warning statement was voluntary. 00 In Gale, the warned statement was not
made "on the heels" of the unwarned statement because it was elicited
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. 952 F.2d 1412 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
93. Id. at 1418.
94. See id. at 1417-18. Since Gale distinguished Carter on its facts, it was unclear, at least to
one court, whether Gale approved of the holding in Carter. See Davis v. United States, 724 A.2d
1163, 1169 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Most other circuit courts of appeal, except for the ones discussed
infra, took an approach similar to Carter and Gale when interpreting Elstad. See, e.g., United States
v. McCurdy, 40 F.3d 1111, 1117-18 (10th Cir. 1994) (distinguishing Carter because of the
intentional violation there, but applying virtually the same analysis).
95. Gale, 952 F.2d at 1417.
96. See id. at 1417-18.
97. Id. at 1417 (quoting Brief for Appellant at 32, Gale, 952 F.2d 1412 (No. 91-3038)).
98. Id. at 1417 (quoting Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 309 (1985)). The court noted that,
logically, Elstad must require more than the kind of "coercion" that will always be present in
custodial interrogation, because if every custodial interrogation were considered coercive under
Elstad "the failure to give Miranda warnings before one statement would always undo a later
statement given after such warnings, thereby fatally undermining the rule of Elstad itself." Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1417-18.
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almost one hour later. 0 1 As a result, the concern voiced in Carter that the
suspect could not make a "voluntary and informed waiver.., for some
indefinite period' once Miranda has been violated"'' 0 2 was not present in the
same way in this case.'0 3 Lastly, the court noted that the officer in Gale
asked only one improper question and the questions were different in the
warned and unwarned phases of questioning. 04 All of this led to the
conclusion that the police did not make the deliberate "end run" around
Miranda that the authorities did in Carter.10 5
The other approach taken by the circuit courts of appeal is illustrated by
United States v. Orso10 6 and United States v. Esquilin.107  In Esquilin, the
First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision to admit
a warned statement after Miranda warnings were intentionally withheld.'0 8
The court rejected the argument that this case was distinguishable from
Elstad on the grounds that there was only one interrogation and no
separation in time between the unwarned and the warned phases. 0 9 The
court held that "the lapse of time between interrogations is relevant only
when the statement obtained in violation of Miranda was actually
coerced."" 0
More importantly, the court considered Esquilin's argument that
deliberate Miranda violations, such as those present there, should
automatically constitute "improper tactics" under Elstad. 1! The court
acknowledged that Elstad did not define "deliberately coercive or improper
tactics" and attempted to interpret the term in harmony with Elstad's
101. Id. at 1418. In fact, the one-hour lapse is similar to Elstad. See supra note 50 and
accompanying text.
102. United States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368, 373 (quoting Elstad, 470 U.S. at 309).
103. See Gale, 952 F.2dat 1418.
104. Id.
105. Id. As a result, the second confession was not involuntary, and was admissible. See id.
106. 266 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2001), overruled in part by Missouri v. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. 2601
(2004).
107. 208 F.3d 315 (1 st Cir. 2000), overruled in part by Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2601.
108. See id. at 319-20.
109. Id. at 319 (citing Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 310-11 (1985)).
110. Id. The court was applying the section of Elstad that said, "When a prior statement is
actually coerced, the time that passes between confessions, the change in place of interrogations, and
the change in identity of the interrogators all bear on whether that coercion has carried over into the
second confession." Elstad, 470 U.S. at 310. But see Gale, 952 F.2d at 1417-18 (considering the
timing issue even though the first statement was not involuntarily made); United States v. Carter,
884 F.2d 368, 373-74 (8th Cir. 1989) (same). Esquilin conflicts with Seibert where timing was
among the list of factors applied. See Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2612 (plurality opinion).
111. Esquilin, 208 F.3d at 320. Recall that Elstad held that an unwarned statement must be
voluntary and cannot be the product of "improper tactics." See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 314. Although
the district court did not make an express finding that the officer's Miranda violation was deliberate,
the court of appeals made that assumption based on the facts and concluded that the district court did
the same. See Esquilin, 208 F.3d at 320 n.5.
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"emphasis on voluntariness" by comparing the phrase to similar wording
used throughout the opinion."'
Ultimately, the court concluded that "improper tactics" simply described
tactics that are "coercive.""' 3 "[R]ead[ing] Elstad as a coherent whole, it
follows that 'deliberately coercive or improper tactics' are not two distinct
categories . . . but simply alternative descriptions of the type of police
conduct that may render a suspect's initial, unwarned statement
involuntary." 1 4  In reaching this conclusion, the court recognized that
although Carter did not involve the interpretation of the specific phrase at
issue in this case, it did hold that an intentional Miranda violation could
invalidate a warned confession even when neither the unwamed or the
warned confessions were coerced." 5 But the court construed that part of
Carter to be dicta and was not persuaded by it. 1 6 As a result, it held that
"Esquilin's unwamed admissions... were not rendered involuntary by
'deliberately coercive or improper tactics.""' 7
In a very similar case, United States v. Orso,'" the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision to admit a warned
confession that was elicited after an unwarned one. 119 In Orso, as in
Esquilin and Carter, the Miranda violation was intentional. 20 In reaching
its conclusion, the court construed Elstad's requirements in a two-part
analysis. First, if the pre-waming statement is actually coerced, then
subsequent statements must be suppressed unless the "violation was
sufficiently attenuated.' 2 ' But if the pre-warning statement was voluntary,
the court should admit the post-warning statement unless it was
112. Esquilin, 208 F.3d at 320.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See id. (citing Carter, 884 F.2d at 372-77).
116. See id. In addition, the court in Esquilin stated that Carter's criticism of a case-by-case
voluntariness analysis was facially inconsistent with Elstad. Id. This comment is arguably
somewhat off-base since Carter was merely recognizing the strong policy argument in favor of
discouraging intentional Miranda violations. See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
117. Esquilin, 208 F.3dat 321.
118. 266 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2001), overruled in part by Missouri v. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. 2601
(2004).
119. Id. at 1040.
120. See id. at 1033-34. In Orso, the suspect was questioned without being given Miranda
warnings while being escorted by postal inspectors to the Postal Inspection Service office. Id. at
1032. The government conceded that Orso was in custody while in the postal inspector's vehicle,
and both the district court and the Ninth Circuit held that she was subject to interrogation. See id. at
1033-34.
121. Id. at 1035 (quoting United States v. Wauneka, 770 F.2d 1434, 1440 (1985)).
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involuntary. 122 The court found both the pre-warning and post-warning
statements to be voluntary so it found no reason to suppress the post-
warning statement. 123
In order to reach that conclusion, the court followed Esquilin in
concluding that the intentional withholding of Miranda warnings does not
constitute "improper tactics" as the court interpreted Elstad.124 The court's
analysis reads like a close paraphrase of Esquilin when it emphasizes
voluntariness as the "overriding theme" and compares similar phrases
throughout the opinion. 125
These cases illustrate that the overarching difference between the
circuits seems to be that an intentional Miranda violation would be enough
to make a prior statement involuntary under Carter and Gale,126 while Orso
and Esquilin take the view that deliberately withholding Miranda warnings
is not, by itself, an "improper tactic" under Elstad that would make a
statement involuntary. 127 Of the four cases, three involved an intentional
withholding of Miranda warnings. In Carter, the court condemned the
deliberate violation and suppressed the statement. 128 But in both Orso and
Esquilin, the courts emphasized that they were not endorsing intentional
Miranda violations, but that they did not violate Elstad.'29 The Court in
Seibert ultimately rejected that approach. 130
III. ANALYSIS OF MISSOURI V. SEIBERT
A Introduction and Facts
In 2004, the Court decided three cases in addition to Seibert in an
apparent effort to clarify Miranda in light of current police practices from
across the country. 131 Among the three, only Fellers v. United States
favored suspects' rights, while the other two, United States v. Patane and
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1040.
124. See id. at 1037-38.
125. See id. at 1036-37. In fact, the opinion includes an extended quote from Esquilin. Id. at
1037 (quoting United States v. Esquilin, 208 F.3d 315, 320 (lst Cir. 2000), overruled in part by
Missouri v. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. 2601 (2004)).
126. See supra notes 86-105 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 106-25 and accompanying text.
128. See United States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368, 373 (8th Cir. 1989).
129. See supra notes 112-16, 121-23 and accompanying text.
130. See infra Part III.
131. See United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004); Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652
(2004); Fellers v. United States, 540 U.S. 519 (2004).
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Yarborough v. Alvarado, upheld the police action at issue.13 As discussed
infra, the Court evened the scorecard by denouncing the question-first, give
Miranda warnings later police technique used in Seibert. 133
The facts of Seibert center on Patrice Seibert's conviction for murder.134
Seibert's son Jonathan, who was severely disabled as a result of cerebral
palsy, died in her care in February of 1997.135 Jonathan's body was covered
in bedsores and Seibert feared charges of neglect so she apparently
consented to a plan to cover up Jonathan's death. 36 The plan, devised by
Seibert and her teenage sons, was to incinerate Jonathan's body in the
process of burning the family's mobile home. 131  In order to avoid the
appearance that Jonathan had been left alone, the plan called for mentally ill
teenager Donald Rector to be present in the home at the time of the fire. 131
The plan, executed by one of Seibert's sons and a friend, resulted in
Donald's death. 139
The primary issue in the case centered on the police tactic used when
Seibert was questioned five days later.' 40 When Seibert was arrested, her
Miranda warnings were intentionally withheld prior to her being questioned
for thirty to forty minutes at the police station. 14 After making an
incriminating statement, she was given a twenty-minute break after which
she was given Miranda warnings and asked to repeat her admission. 142
132. Compare Missouri v. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. 2601 (2004) (suppressing second statement when
intentional two-step interrogation technique was used), and Fellers, 540 U.S. at 519 (unanimously
rejecting police practice of interrogating indicted suspects without first telling them they have a right
to a lawyer), with Patane, 542 U.S. at 630 (refusing to suppress the physical fruits of a statement
made by a suspect who told the officer not to read him his rights because he already knew them),
and Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 652 (refusing to create a special rule for minors undergoing police
questioning).
133. See infra notes 150-63 and accompanying text.
134. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2605-06 (plurality opinion).
135. Id. at 2606; State v. Seibert, 93 S.W.3d 700, 701 (Mo. 2000) (noting that Jonathan "could not
walk, talk or feed himself").
136. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2605 (plurality opinion); State v. Seibert, 93 S.W.3d at 701.
137. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2605 (plurality opinion).
138. Id. Rector was living with the family at the time. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 2606.
141. Id. Officer Hanrahan testified at a suppression hearing that he specifically instructed the
arresting officer not to advise Seibert of her Miranda rights. Id. The officer stated that he
consciously chose to withhold warnings in hopes of getting a confession. Id.; see State v. Seibert, 93
S.W.3d at 702. He utilized this technique because his department, as well as others he had worked
for, trained officers to use it. State v. Seibert, 93 S.W.3d at 702.
142. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2606 (plurality opinion). Respondent incriminated herself by admitting
that she was aware that Donald was supposed to die in the fire. Id.; see infra APPENDIX A.
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Seibert waived her Miranda rights and officer Hanrahan continued to
question her, this time recording her answers. 143 When officer Hanrahan
confronted respondent with her prior admission, she repeated it.'"
B. The Road to the Final Court
A trial court in Rolla, Missouri, admitted Seibert's inculpatory post-
warning statements and she was convicted of second-degree murder. 145 On
appeal, the Missouri Court of Appeals applied Elstad and found that despite
the intentional Miranda violation, Seibert's warned statement was
voluntarily made and therefore admissible. 146 However, the Missouri
Supreme Court distinguished Elstad on the basis of the intentional violation
in this case. 147 Applying an intent-based approach similar to the Eighth
Circuit in Carter, the Court held the tactics here to be "undeniably an 'end
run' around Miranda." 14' As a result, it suppressed the post-waming
statement and reversed the conviction.
149
C. The Plurality's Approach
1. Snapshot of the Holding: Statement Suppressed
The plurality opinion, written by Justice Souter, was joined by Justices
Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer. 5 These "liberal" justices agreed with each
other several times on criminal justice issues in 2004.1'' Justice Kennedy,
143. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2606 (plurality opinion).
144. Id. Officer Hanrahan began the second stage of the interrogation by saying, "'Ok, 'trice,
we've been talking for a little while about what happened on Wednesday the twelfth, haven't we?'
Id. It was clear that "Seibert was reminded of the statements she made during the first [unwarned]
stage." State v. Seibert, 93 S.W.3d at 702. Officer Hanrahan also phrased his questions based on
respondent's pre-warning statements. See id.; see infra APPENDIX A.
145. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2606 (plurality opinion).
146. State v. Seibert, No. 23729, 2002 WL 114804, at *8 (Mo. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2002).
147. State v. Seibert, 93 S.W.3d 700, 704 (Mo. 2003).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 707.
150. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2605 (plurality opinion). Justice Souter authored three majority or
plurality criminal justice opinions this term. See United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 124 S. Ct.
2333 (2004) (requiring a defendant challenging his guilty plea on grounds the court committed plain
error to show a reasonable probability that, but for this error, he would not have entered the plea);
Sabri v. United States, 124 S. Ct. 1941 (2004) (finding a federal bribery statute constitutional and
resolving a split between the circuits); United States v. Banks, 124 S. Ct. 521 (2003) (holding that an
interval of fifteen to twenty seconds from officers' announcement of search warrant before forced
entry into a home was reasonable, given the risk of possible destruction of evidence).
151. For example, these four Justices helped form the majority in Groh v. Ramirez, 124 S. Ct.
1284 (2004) (invalidating a search where the search warrant application described the persons and
things to be seized, but the search warrant itself did not). Also, these four collectively dissented in
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who provided the fifth vote for suppression, concurred in the judgment
only. 52 One result of this split, discussed in more detail later, is that more
Justices disagree with the plurality's analysis than agree with it. Placing that
issue aside, the plurality's primary holding was that the Miranda warnings
recited after Seibert's unwarned confession were not effective, so her
subsequent confession was inadmissible.'53
2. The Plurality's Concerns about the Question-First Technique
The overarching theme of the plurality opinion is that the four Justices
are troubled by the prevalence and purpose of the "question-first" tactic
"which by any objective measure reveal[s] a police strategy adapted to
undermine the Miranda warnings."' 5 4 The plurality noted that there are no
statistics that detail how widely the technique is used, but concluded that it is
"of some popularity" after examining the several cases that had dealt with
that tactic and similar practices and citing a number of police training
organizations that advocate the technique. 55 The fact that the technique is
Yarborough v. Alvarado, 124 S. Ct. 2140 (2004), and United States v. Patane, 124 S. Ct. 2620
(2004), both interpreting Miranda as discussed supra in note 132, in addition to several other
criminal law cases. See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Beard
v. Banks, 124 S. Ct. 2504 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct. of Nev.,
124 S. Ct. 2451 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
In the other cases interpreting Miranda last term, two resulted in a split of the Court similar
to Seibert. In Yarborough, Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion which was joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and O'Connor. Yarborough, 124 S. Ct. at 2140. As
noted above, the four liberal Justices dissented. Id. This split is the same as Seibert except that
Justice Kennedy's conclusion is joined by the dissenters from Seibert. Id. The split of the Court in
Patane is identical to Yarborough with different Justices penning the opinions for the respective
sides. Pantane, 124 S. Ct. at 2624.
152. See Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2605 (plurality opinion). Justice Kennedy filed an opinion
concurring in the judgment, and Justice O'Connor filed a dissenting opinion joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, and Justices Scalia and Thomas. Id. When the Supreme Court "decides a case and no
single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the holding of the court may
be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgment on the narrowest
grounds."' Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
159, 169 n. 15 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, & Stevens, JJ.)). The narrowest grounds in this
case appear to be the approach taken in Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion, discussed infra in
Part IV.B.
153. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2605 (plurality opinion).
154. Id. at 2612.
155. Id. at 2608-09 & nn.2-3. The plurality acknowledged that although most police manuals do
not advocate the question-first tactic, several groups including the Police Law Institute and the
California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training apparently teach similar practices.
See id. at 2609 & n.2. Officer Hanrahan also testified at trial that the question-first tactic is taught by
a national training organization and has been used by other police departments he had worked for.
widely used came as no surprise to the plurality: "the reason that question-
first is catching on is as obvious as its manifest purpose, which is to get a
confession the suspect would not make if he understood his rights at the
outset." 156 The plurality acknowledged that the technique is effective, but
stressed that effectiveness has never been the deciding factor for
admissibility."'
Even more significant to the plurality was the fact that the question-first
tactic undermines the purpose of Miranda.11 In denouncing the tactic, the
opinion emphatically stated that "[s]trategists dedicated to draining the
substance out of Miranda cannot accomplish by training instructions what
Dickerson held Congress could not do by statute."' 59 The very purpose of
Miranda, according to the plurality, is to target "'interrogation practices...
likely.., to disable [an individual] from making a free and rational choice'
about speaking."'160 The question-first method does just that because the
suspect may simply become "bewildered," which is "an unpromising frame
of mind for knowledgeable decision."' 6' More specifically, the plurality
predicted that if a suspect is not informed that unwarned statements are
inadmissible, he could reasonably assume "that what he has just said will be
used." 162 With its disdain for the technique obvious for the reasons
discussed above, the plurality sets out to develop a test to eliminate it.
163
State v. Seibert, 93 S.W.3d 700, 702 (Mo. 2002). After the Court's decision, several law
enforcement organizations denied using or teaching the technique, including the International
Association of Chiefs of Police. See Jerry Markon, Police Tactic to Sidestep Miranda Rights
Rejected, WASHINGTON POST, June 29, 2004, at Al.
156. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2610-11 (plurality opinion).
157. See id. The "question-first" method is widely acknowledged as being more effective than
giving Miranda warnings first. See Steven D. Clymer, Are Police Free to Disregard Miranda?, 112
YALE L.J. 447, 517 (2002) (noting that "[tihe most obvious advantage to questioning a suspect
without first giving warnings is that" the suspect is less likely to assert the right to silence).
Implicit in this statement by the plurality is that other forms of questioning are surely effective but
violate the Fifth Amendment.
158. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2613 (plurality opinion).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 2607 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 464-465 (1966)). According to the
plurality, the focus is "'simply whether the warnings reasonably conve[y] ... his rights as required
by Miranda."' Id. at 2610 (quoting Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203 (1989)).
161. Id. at2611.
162. Id. This argument is basically just a reworded statement of the "cat out of the bag" approach
which was rejected by the Court in Elstad. That approach recognizes that "the coercive impact of
the ... [unwarned statement] remains, because in a defendant's mind it has sealed his fate." State v.
Elstad, 658 P.2d 552, 554 (1983), rev'd, 470 U.S. 298 (1985). Justice O'Connor correctly points out
in her dissent that the plurality's test ignores stare decisis by implicitly adopting this approach. See
Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2618-19 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also infra note 270 and accompanying
text.
163. See Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2610 (plurality opinion).
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3. The Plurality's Arguably Vague Test: Did Miranda Warnings
Fulfill Their Purpose?
Recognizing the effect of question-first tactics on Miranda, the plurality
held that the "threshold issue when interrogators question first and warn later
is thus whether it would be reasonable to find that in these circumstances the
[Miranda] warnings could function 'effectively' as Miranda requires.' '164 In
other words, the Court needs to determine whether "the warnings [could]
effectively advise the suspect that he had a real choice about giving an
admissible statement at that juncture." '165 If not, then formal issuance of
warnings cannot be effective. 1
66
In adopting this "effectiveness" test, the plurality (except for Justice
Breyer) expressly rejected application of the fruit of the poisonous tree
analysis in this context. 167 By summarily rebuffing the fruits analysis, the
Court avoided a potentially difficult issue that some commentators had
predicted would arise after the Court held Miranda to be constitutionally
required in Dickerson.168 The approach taken here sidesteps the problems
with that test, while focusing on the more salient issue: the effectiveness of
Miranda. However, as Justice Breyer recognizes, this test will likely be very
similar in effect to a fruits analysis. 169
4. The Plurality Announces Five Factors to Assist in Applying Its Test
To determine whether Miranda warnings given mid-interrogation are
effective as described above, the plurality identified five factors to
consider. 7 ° First, the plurality looked at "the completeness and detail of the
164. Id. (emphasis added). Note that this is not a bright line rule, but requires a more complex and
subjective case-by-case analysis. See id. at 2615-16 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
165. Id. at 2610 (plurality opinion).
166. Id. "In a sequential confession case, clarity is served if the later confession is approached by
asking whether in the circumstances the Miranda warnings given could reasonably be found
effective." Id. at 2610 n.4.
167. Id. at 2610 n.4.
168. See The Supreme Court: 2003 Term-Leading Cases, 118 HARV. L. REv. 248, 314-16
(2004).
169. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2613 (Breyer, J., concurring).
170. Id. at 2612 (plurality opinion). Apparently dissatisfied with Elstad, some states interpreted
their state constitutions as providing more protection from police failure to give Miranda warnings.
See Barbieri, supra note 70, at 67. Several states that took such action formulated standards similar
to those announced by the plurality in Seibert. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 834 S.W.2d 915, 919-20
(Tenn. 1992) (establishing a nine-factor totality of the circumstances test that includes consideration
of whether coercive tactics were used, the temporal proximity of the statements, the location of the
interrogation, and the identity of the interrogators among others).
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questions and answers in the first round of interrogation.""'' Second, it
considered "the overlapping content of the two statements."'' 72 Third, it
found important the "timing and setting of the first and second
[statements].' 73 Fourth, it looked at "the continuity of police personnel.' 74
Lastly, the plurality considered "the degree to which the interrogator's
questions treated the second round as continuous with the first."'7 5 Another
factor that was not announced with the others, but nevertheless was
considered by the plurality, was whether the formal warning included notice
that previous statements could not be used. 176 The plurality does not hold
that such a warning is sufficient to make an ensuing statement admissible,
"but its absence is clearly a factor" in determining whether there is a
continuing interrogation or a new session. 177
5. Applying the Factors to Seibert
In applying the factors to the case at bar, the plurality concluded that the
second statement was inadmissible because at the time Seibert was given the
Miranda warnings they could not have been effective. 78 First, the unwarned
questions were detailed and amounted to a complete interrogation. 179 The
plurality noted, "[w]hen the police were finished there was little, if anything,
of incriminating potential left unsaid."'
' 80
As to the overlapping content of two statements, it was reasonable for
the suspect to view the two interrogation sessions as part of a continuum, "in
which it would have been unnatural to refuse to repeat at the second stage
what had been said before."' 8' The statements were substantially the same
in the warned and unwarned interrogations. 182 The timing and setting of the
171. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2612 (plurality opinion). The plurality does not specify how complete
or how detailed the questions must be. It also does not address the situation where questions may be
very detailed but incomplete, or the situation where the questioning is complete but not detailed.
172. Id. As one court has noted, the plurality does not provide "explicit guidance" as to what this
factor means. United States v. Kiam, 343 F. Supp. 2d 398, 408 (E.D. Pa. 2004).
173. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2612 (plurality opinion). The only guidance the Court gives as to this
factor is that an interrogation in the same place with only a fifteen to twenty minute break was too
close in time and setting. Id. The lack of precision as to this factor begs the question of what
happens when the warned and unwarned confessions are very close in time but are elicited in
different locations, or elicited at the same location but after a substantial break.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 2612-13 & n.7.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 2612-13.
179. See id. at 2612.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 2613.
182. See id.
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first and the second statements also weighed in favor of invalidating the
warned statement because both statements were given in the police station
with "a pause of only fifteen to twenty minutes."' 83 Likewise, the plurality
reached the same result applying the continuity of police personnel factor
because the same officer conducted both interviews.
84
In addition, the second round of questioning could be reasonably viewed
as continuous with the first.'85 "The impression that the further questioning
was a mere continuation of the earlier questions and responses was fostered
by references back to the confession already given.' ', 86 Also relevant to the
Court was the fact that Officer Hanrahan gave no warnings to Seibert that
her prior statements could not be used.
187
6. The Plurality Rejects an Intent-Based Test As Too Troublesome
The plurality distinguished Oregon v. Elstad18 8 as a case involving a
"good-faith Miranda mistake."'' 89 Specifically, the plurality noted "[a]t the
opposite extreme [of Elstad] are the facts here, which by any objective
measure reveal a police strategy adapted to undermine the Miranda
warnings."1 90  The Elstad court did conclude that "a simple failure to
administer the warnings, unaccompanied by any actual coercion or other
circumstances calculated to undermine the suspect's ability to exercise his
free will" does not invalidate the process 9 But Elstad did not expressly
conclude that the officer's state of mind was determinative. 92 That case
simply held that a good-faith mistake was corrected by subsequent Miranda
warnings. 193
183. Id. at 2612 (noting that "[t]he unwamed interrogation was conducted in the station house, and
the questioning was systematic, exhaustive, and managed with psychological skill").
184. Id.; see also infra APPENDIX A (demonstrating that the same officer conducted both
interrogation sessions).
185. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2612-13 (plurality opinion).
186. Id. at 2613.
187. Id. at 2612; see also infra APPENDIX A (containing excerpts from of the second interrogation
session).
188. 470 U.S. 298 (1985). The facts of Elstad are summarized supra at notes 47-51 and
accompanying text.
189. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2612 (plurality opinion).
190. Id.
191. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 309.
192. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2612 (plurality opinion).
193. Id.
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Regarding the issue of officer intent, Seibert proposed a test that would
exclude all evidence obtained through deliberate or objectively unreasonable
Miranda violations. 94 The plurality implicitly agreed with the respondent
that clear evidence of intent can aid the inquiry195 But the plurality
emphasized officer intent is not determinative and serves merely as a factor
to consider. 196 Justice Souter explained that "[b]ecause the intent of the
officer will rarely be as candidly admitted as it was [in Seibert] . . . the focus
[should be] on facts apart from intent that show the question-first tactic at
work." 197 In her dissenting opinion, Justice O'Connor applauded the
plurality for rejecting an intent-based test. 198 Although the plurality
expressly rejected an approach that required an inquiry into officer intent,
lower courts applying the plurality test have fairly construed it as rejecting
use of the question-first tactic, which is an intentional Miranda violation.' 99
The plurality's denunciation of an intent-based test rejected the rationale
of the Missouri Supreme Court insofar as that court emphasized the officer's
subjective intent in distinguishing Elstad and reaching its holding.0 0 Justice
Kennedy, concurring in the judgment, disagreed with the plurality on this
point and would suppress the second statement when the two-step




7. The Plurality Further Distinguishes Elstad
Because the plurality's test is not based on evidence of officer intent, it
is the application of the five factors, and not the intentional nature of the
violation, that provide the Court better grounds to distinguish Elstad.2 °2
Applying the factors to Elstad, the Court concluded that the first and second
194. See Brief for Respondent at 24-29, Seibert, 124 S. Ct. 2601 (No. 02-1371), available at
http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/pdfs_03/1371resp.pdf. This is Justice Kennedy's
test. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2615 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
195. See Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2612 n.6 (plurality opinion); Brief for Respondent, supra note 194,
at 24-29 ("When evidence of subjective intent is available ... [it can] aid the inquiry."). Such
evidence was available in Siebert because the officer testified that he intentionally withheld Miranda
warnings. See id. at 2606.
196. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2612 n.6 (plurality opinion).
197. Id.
198. Id. at 2617-18 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
199. See infra Part IV.B. Those cases recognize that use of the question-first tactic can be
established without evaluating the officer's intent. More astute lower courts have nonetheless
focused on officer intent when applying Seibert because they viewed Justice Kennedy's concurring
opinion to be the narrowest grounds of the Court's holding. See infra Part IV.B.2.
200. State v. Seibert, 93 S.W.3d 700, 703-07 (Mo. 2002).
201. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2616 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
202. See id. at 2612 n.6 (plurality opinion).
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questionings in that case created a "markedly different experience. ' 2 °3
Accordingly, the warnings given in Elstad were effective under the
circumstances.
1 4
8. The Plurality Concludes that Seibert's Warned Statement is
Inadmissible
Because warnings were not adequately given, Seibert's warned
statement had to be excluded whether or not it was made voluntarily;
therefore, the plurality did not discuss whether the statement was
voluntary. 2 5 The State of Missouri argued that the two-stage interrogation
should be allowed as long as the unwarned statement is not admitted in the
case in chief and the subsequent statement is voluntary. 0 6 The Court
implicitly rejected that argument by ending the analysis once the Miranda
warnings were found to be inadequate in this case.20 7
The plurality summed up its holding by saying: "Because the question-
first tactic effectively threatens to thwart Miranda's purpose of reducing the
risk that a coerced confession would be admitted, and because the facts here
do not reasonably support a conclusion that the warnings given could have
served their purpose, Seibert's postwarning statements are inadmissible.,
20 8
9. Critique of the Plurality's Approach
The plurality's approach is well-intentioned but is ultimately somewhat
vague.20 9 The problem seems to arise from the plurality's desire to curb the
203. Id. at 2612. In reaching that conclusion, the Court noted that that there was a significant
break in time and a change in location between confessions. Id. Also, a different officer conducted
the post-warning interrogation, which did not include reference to the unwarned statement. Id.
204. Id.
205. See id. at 2613 n.8.
206. See Brief for Petitioner at 11-17, Seibert, 124 S. Ct. 2601 (No. 02-1371), available at
http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/pdfs_03/1371 Pet.pdf. Respondent countered by
citing a number of cases emphasizing that Miranda warnings must be given before interrogation.
See, e.g., Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 171 (2001) ("[T]here can be no doubt that a suspect must be
apprised of his rights against compulsory self-incrimination... before authorities may conduct
custodial interrogation."); see also Brief Amici Curiae of Former Prosecutors et al., Supporting
Respondent at 6, Siebert, 124 S. Ct. 2601 (No. 02-1371), 2003 WL 22359207 (citing cases
emphasizing that Miranda warning must be given before interrogation).
207. See Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2613 (plurality opinion).
208. Id.
209. As the notes above point out, the plurality's factors are arguably ill-defined, but no court
applying them has yet voiced any criticism of them or has seemed to struggle to apply them. See
infra Part IV.B.
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use of the troubling question-first tactic without focusing on officer intent.
Dismissing a test that inquires about the intent of the officer as too difficult,
the plurality instead implements another difficult-to-apply test based on a list
of ill-defined factors.2t0 The reasons for rejecting an intent-based test are
sound, but the plurality's amorphous test does more to empower judges to
impose their subjective opinions without providing them much concrete
direction. Additionally, the plurality does not apply the fruit of the
poisonous tree test in this case although its approach seems quite similar.2
D. Justice Kennedy's Approach
Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment but found the plurality's test
too broad.212 He explained that the plurality's test "envisions an objective
inquiry from the perspective of the suspect, and applies in the case of both
intentional and unintentional two-stage interrogations," a test that in his
view "cuts too broadly." '2 13 In his opinion he rejected the plurality's
approach, denounced the question-first tactic, distinguished Elstad, and then
proposed and applied his own test. 214 Justice Kennedy criticized the
plurality's decision to employ a multi-factor test to every two-stage
interrogation, whether or not the violation of Miranda is intentional, because
such an approach undermines one of the greatest strengths of Miranda, its
clarity.215
Next, Justice Kennedy argued that the question-first tactic used in
Seibert should not be recognized as a valid exception to Miranda. 216
Although this proposition is hardly controversial, Justice Kennedy supported
his rejection of the Seibert tactic by stating that valid exceptions to Miranda
210. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2612 (plurality opinion).
211. See id. at 2617 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (pointing out that the plurality's approach
examines the same facts as a fruits analysis). The factors themselves are similar to an examination
of whether taint has dissipated.
212. Id. at 2614, 2616 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that the plurality test cuts too broadly).
Other courts have also found Justice Kennedy's test to be narrower. See, e.g., United States v.
Aguilar, 384 F.3d 520, 525 (8th Cir. 2004). Although it is narrower than the plurality approach, it is
a different test that requires something additional that the plurality does not-a determination of
intent.
213. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2616 (Kennedy, J., concurring). When the Supreme Court decides a
case and "no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the holding of
the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgment on
the narrowest grounds."' Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v.
Georgia, 148 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, & Stevens, JJ.)). Since Justice
Kennedy's approach is narrower, it is the holding of the Court.
214. See Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2614-16 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
215. Id. at 2616. Justice Kennedy emphasized that as a result of its bright-line rule, Miranda has
become "an important and accepted element of the criminal justice system." Id. at 2614 (citing
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000)).
216. See id. at 2615.
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recognize that evidence should be admitted when "it would further important
objectives without compromising Miranda's purpose.217 He then pointed
out that the technique used in Seibert distorts Miranda's objectives and
"furthers no legitimate countervailing interest., 218  In addition, Justice
Kennedy noted that Seibert illustrates the temptation for abuse inherent in
the two-step questioning technique. 1 9
Such temptations for abuse were not present in Elstad, which Justice
Kennedy distinguished as not involving deliberate use of the question-first
technique.220 Justice Kennedy further distinguished Elstad by recognizing
that the unwarned confession was used to elicit the second confession in
Seibert, the suspect in Seibert was confronted with her unwarned statements,
and also that Seibert was subjected to an extended interview.22 '
Since Seibert raised issues that Elstad was not intended to control,
Justice Kennedy felt that a different test should apply to cases such as
Seibert. 222 He concluded that Elstad should continue to govern the
admissibility of post-warning statements as long as the deliberate question-
first interrogation technique was not employed.2 2 3 But when the two-step
strategy is deliberately used in a calculated way to undermine Miranda,
"postwarning statements that are related to the substance of prewarning
statements must be excluded unless curative measures are taken before the
postwarning statement is made. 224
Appropriate curative measures should ensure that "a reasonable person
in the suspect's situation would understand the import and effect of the
Miranda warning and of the Miranda waiver. 2 25 Justice Kennedy went on
to illustrate appropriate curative measures. 226 For example, "a substantial
break in time and circumstances" between the two interrogations "may
suffice in most circumstances" because "it allows the accused to distinguish
the two contexts and appreciate that the interrogation has taken a new
turn. ' 227 In addition, an explanation that the pre-warning statement is likely
217. Id. at 2614.
218. Id. at 2615.
219. Id.
220. See id.
221. See id. at 2615-16.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 2616.
224. Id. at 2615-16. Under this approach, examination of the officer's intent is implicit in the
analysis according to both the plurality and the dissent. See supra Part IlI.C; infra Part IlI.F.
225. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2616 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
226. Id. at 2616.
227. Id.
449
inadmissible may be sufficient. 228 By recognizing that these curative
measures can make a second, warned statement admissible, Justice Kennedy
refused to find that the tactics used in Seibert are "inherently wrong.,
229
This section of Justice Kennedy's opinion has been described by at least one
commentator as an "instructional manual" for police to get a second, warned
statement into evidence when a suspect had already made an earlier
unwarned statement. 230 However, this argument ignores the fact that one of
the essential functions of the Court is to provide guidance for law
enforcement to perform its duties within the strictures of the Constitution.3
In applying his test to the facts of Seibert, Justice Kennedy concluded
that because officer Hanrahan admitted that he deliberately used the
question-first tactic to circumvent Miranda and the post-warning statements
were essentially just a repeat of the first, the first part of the test was
satisfied.232 Justice Kennedy went on to hold that since no curative steps had
been taken, the statement must be suppressed.233
As a result, Justice Kennedy reached the same conclusion as the
plurality but did so by applying a narrower approach. 4 It is more narrow
because he dispenses with the objective multi-factor test for "effectiveness,"
in favor of a test that evaluates only whether the failure to give Miranda
warnings was deliberate or not.235 And while this approach is superficially
appealing because it applies an already established test, the fact that seven
Justices disagree with it highlights its unpopularity with the Court. Further,
it requires courts to find that an officer subjectively intended to violate
Miranda and used the question-first technique.236 As both the plurality and
dissent point out, this simply will not be possible much of the time.237
228. See id. This was also a factor considered by the plurality, but the plurality concluded that:
We do not hold that a formal addendum warning that a previous statement could not be
used would be sufficient to change the character of the question-first procedure to the
point of rendering an ensuing statement admissible, but its absence is clearly a factor
that.., points to a continuing, not a new, interrogation.
Id. at 2612 n.7 (plurality opinion).
229. Terry Caner, Miranda Still a Puzzle for the High Court, ABA J. eREPORT, July 2, 2004, 3
NO. 26 A.B.A. J. E-Report 5 (Westlaw).
230. See Marcia Coyle, 2003-2004 Term: Supreme Court Review: Flexing Muscle and Wisdom,
NAT'L L.J., Aug, 2, 2004, at S1, S6; see also infra Part IV.B.
231. See, e.g., Muehleman v. Florida, 484 U.S. 882, 887 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("We
owe it to law enforcement officials and the courts to establish clearly the line across which
constitutional error lies.").
232. See Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2615 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
233. Id. at2616.
234. See id.
235. See id. at 2615-16; see also United States v. Stewart, 388 F.3d 1079, 1089 (7th Cir. 2004)
(applying Seibert).
236. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2615-16 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
237. See id. at 2618 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (discussing the plurality's argument as well).
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E. Justice Breyer's Concurring Opinion
In a brief concurring opinion, Justice Breyer proposed that "[c]ourts
should exclude the 'fruits' of the initial unwarned questioning unless the
failure to warn was in good faith. 2 38 Justice Breyer joined the plurality's
opinion in full because he felt that its test would function the same as his in
practice.2 39 He explained that, in his view, the plurality's test will function
as a fruits analysis in practice because "truly 'effective' Miranda warnings
on which the plurality insists,... will occur only when certain
circumstances ... [such as the plurality's factors] intervene between the
unwarned questioning and any postwarning statement., 240 He advocated the
"fruits" approach because, in his view, it would be practicable and relatively
simple for lower courts since they are already familiar with the fruits
analysis.24' Justice Breyer's approach varies in two important ways from the
approach taken by both the plurality and dissent. First, it is a "good faith"
test that requires the Court to examine the officer's intent.2 42 Second, he
would apply the fruits approach, which both the plurality and dissent
dismissed. 243 Interestingly, Justice Breyer also agreed with Justice
Kennedy's opinion "insofar as it is consistent with this approach and makes
clear that a good-faith exception applies."24
F. Justice 0 'Connor's Dissent
Justice O'Connor's dissent was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Scalia and Thomas.245 The opinion began with Justice O'Connor
voicing her disagreement with the plurality's treatment of Elstad, which she
considered to be on point.246  She then discussed the common ground
238. Id. at 2613 (Breyer, J., concurring).
239. Id. at 2613-14.
240. Id. at2613.
241. Id.
242. Id. An intent-based approach was rejected by both the plurality and the dissent. See supra
Part IlI.C; infra Part III.F.
243. See Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2610 n.4 (plurality opinion) ("[T]he Court in Elstad rejected the...
fruits doctrine for analyzing the admissibility of a subsequent warned confession following 'an
initial failure. .. to administer the warnings required by Miranda."' (quoting Oregon v. Elstad, 470
U.S. 298, 300 (1985)); Id. at 2616-17 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
244. Id. at 2614 (Breyer, J., concurring).
245. Id. at 2616 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
246. Id. at 2616 (accusing the plurality of "devour[ing]" Elstad). Justice Rehnquist also joined
Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in Elstad. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 299.
between her view and that taken by the plurality.247 For example, she agreed
with the plurality that the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine developed in
Fourth Amendment cases cannot be used to make Seibert's confession
inadmissible. 24 She argued that this analysis is inapplicable for several
reasons.24 9 First, in United States v. Patane,25 ° the Court chose not to extend
the fruit of the poisonous tree analysis to physical fruits of a Miranda
violation.5 Second, Justice O'Connor concluded that precedent required
rejection of the fruits analysis in this context by citing the majority opinion
she authored in Elstad nearly twenty years earlier. 2
Justice O'Connor went on to note that under the plurality's approach,
courts would be forced to examine the same facts as they would in a fruits
analysis.25 3 But she also pointed out that the plurality's test is not the same
as a fruits analysis because it considers those facts for different reasons than
it would in a fruits analysis. 4 Namely, in applying a fruits analysis, courts
examine facts in order to balance the deterrence value of excluding evidence
with the social cost that exclusion has on criminal prosecutions.2 5  But the
plurality used the facts to make a "psychological judgment regarding
whether the suspect ha[d] been informed effectively of her right to remain
silent.,
25 6
The second point of agreement between Justice O'Connor's dissent and
the plurality is that both rejected a test that required courts to determine the
subjective intent of the interrogating officers.257 Justice O'Connor pointed
out that this approach is sound because the voluntariness of a suspect's
statement is a function of his state of mind. 258  And the intent of the
247. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2616-18 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
248. Id. at 2616-17 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
249. Id.
250. 124 S. Ct. 2620 (2004).
251. Id. at 2631 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 441
(2000) (noting that the Court's decision not to apply the fruits doctrine in Elstad "simply
recognizes... that unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment are different from unwarned
interrogation under the Fifth Amendment").
252. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2616 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
253. Id. at 2617.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 2617 (citing Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 442-43 (1984)).
256. Id. (emphasis omitted); see also The Supreme Court: 2003 Term-Leading Cases, supra note
168, at 312 (agreeing that although the two approaches each consider how an unwarned statement
impacts the warned one, the reasons are different).
257. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2617-18 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Since Justice Kennedy's
"deliberate violation" approach requires an inquiry into an interrogator's intent, Justice O'Connor
would reject it. See id.
258. Id. at2617.
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interrogator does not affect a suspect's state of mind. 9 She explained that
"[a] suspect who experienced the exact same interrogation as Siebert, save
for a difference in the undivulged, subjective intent of the interrogating
officer when he failed to give Miranda warnings, would not experience the
interrogation any differently. 26 °
Justice O'Connor also argues that policy mandates rejection of an
intent-based test. An inquiry into subjective intent is an "unattractive
proposition" largely because of the potential for waste of judicial
resources.2 61 The difficulties that accompany an intent-based test have led
the Court to reject it in other criminal procedure contexts as well.262
Justice O'Connor concluded that since Officer Hanrahan's intent "could
not by itself affect the voluntariness of [Seibert's] confession" it should not
be considered.263 Although Officer Hanrahan openly admitted his intentions
in this case, intent will often not be so easily established. 26
Because Justice Kennedy's approach centers on whether the two-step
interrogation technique was "deliberate" and "calculated" Justice O'Connor
rejected it because it requires a determination of intent.265 In particular, she
criticizes Justice Kennedy's approach as adding the troublesome step of
determining the officer's intent to the existing inquiry as to the adequacy of
Miranda warnings and whether the statement was voluntary.266 Justice
O'Connor concluded that under Justice Kennedy's test, courts "will be
forced to conduct the kind of difficult, state-of-mind inquiry that we
normally take pains to avoid.,
267
259. Id. at 2617-18; accord, United States v. Esquilin, 208 F.3d 315, 321 (lst Cir. 2000),
overruled in part by Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2601 (noting that a suspect is free invoke his right to
remain silent regardless of the officer's intent).
260. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2618 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor supports her
argument by citing cases that have applied the same rule in different criminal procedure contexts.
Id. (citing Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 324-25 (1994) (per curiam) (holding that whether a
suspect is considered to be in custody is not affected by the police officer's subjective intent)).
261. Id. ("'[S]ending state and federal courts on an expedition into the minds of police officers
would produce a grave and fruitless misallocation of judicial resources."') (quoting United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 n.23 (1984)).
262. Id. For example, the Court rejected an intent-based test when creating the "public safety"
exception to Miranda. Id. (citing New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984); Whren v. United
States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996)).
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 2618-19 ("This approach untethers the analysis from facts knowable to ... the
suspect."). The plurality rejects Justice Kennedy's approach for the same reason. See id. at 2612 n.6
(plurality opinion).
266. Id. at 2618-19 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
267. Id. at 2619.
Justice O'Connor strongly disagreed with the plurality's decision to
"ignore[] the dictates of stare decisis" and create its own test for determining
the admissibility of Seibert's statement because she felt that Elstad
controls.268 In particular, Justice O'Connor argued that the approach taken
by the plurality is essentially the same as the approach adopted by the
Oregon Court of Appeals but rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Elstad. 269 That approach accepts the argument that "the 'lingering
compulsion' inherent in a defendant's having let the 'cat out of the bag' [by
making the first confession] required suppression. ' '27 That approach was
rejected by the Supreme Court in Elstad because to allow it "would
'effectively immuniz[e] a suspect who responds to pre-Miranda warning
questions from the consequences of his subsequent informed waiver.' ' 271
The Court in Elstad concluded that such a rule would simply be too
detrimental to legitimate police activity.2 72 Justice O'Connor went on to
emphasize that even if the plurality disagreed with the balance struck in
Elstad between suspects' rights and police interests, that is not grounds for
refusing to follow that case.273
Justice O'Connor proposed to analyze confessions elicited by the two-
step interrogation procedure under the voluntariness standard she announced
in Elstad. 274 Under that approach, the ultimate issue is whether the
statements were voluntarily made.2 75 That approach also allows a court to
consider the actions of the officer as part of the totality of the
circumstances.276 Significantly, Justice O'Connor acknowledges that Seibert
may be distinguishable from Elstad because Officer Hanrahan's tactic to
268. Id.
269. Id. (describing the "cat out of the bag" approach).
270. Id. at 2619 (quoting from Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 311 (1984)). The Oregon Court of
Appeals aptly described the "cat out of the bag" approach by stating "the coercive impact of the
unconstitutionally obtained statement remains, because in the defendant's mind it has sealed his
fate." State v. Elstad, 658 P.2d 552, 554 (Or. Ct. App. 1983), quoted in Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2619
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). The idea first appeared in United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 540
(1947) ("[A]fter an accused has once let the cat out of the bag.., he is never thereafter free of the
psychological and practical advantages of having confessed.").
271. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2619 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Although the plurality opinion can be
read generally to endorse this kind of approach, it never goes so far as to hold that a suspect would
always be "immunized" against the consequences of his warned statement. To the contrary, the
plurality emphasized that as long as the warnings could be effective when given to the suspect, his
second statement could be validly admitted. See id. at 2610 (plurality opinion).
272. Id. at 2619. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
273. Id.
274. Id.; see also supra Part II.C.1 (discussing Elstad).
275. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2619 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[l]f Seibert's first statement is shown
to have been involuntary, the court must examine whether the taint dissipated through the passing of
time or a change in circumstances .... In addition, Seibert's second statement should be suppressed
if she showed that it was involuntary despite the Miranda warnings.").
276. Id.
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"'exploit the unwarned admission to pressure [the suspect] into waiving his
right to remain silent' was not used in Elstad.2 7 Such a tactic may have
made Seibert's warned confession involuntary, and thus inadmissible under
Elstad.278 Justice O'Connor would have the Missouri court apply this
analysis on remand.279 Since Justice O'Connor left open the possibility that
Seibert's second statement could have been involuntary, her opinion is not
completely inconsistent with the holding of the plurality.2
80
While Justice O'Connor's approach is defensible under existing
precedent, one weakness is that it fails to adequately condemn or limit the
question-first tactic. 281 The voluntariness approach she endorses is the
approach currently used by courts in the question-first context and most
courts have been reluctant to find the warned confession involuntary on facts
similar to Seibert.25 2 If the Court had affirmed that approach here, it would
have done little to discourage the use of the question-first tactic.
IV. IMPACT OF MISSOURI V. SEIBERTON PRECEDENT, LOWER COURTS, LAW
ENFORCEMENT, AND PATRICE SEIBERT
A. Effect on Oregon v. Elstad
The Seibert plurality did not go so far as to overrule Elstad, but did limit
its application, potentially in a severe way.283 In explaining the relationship
between Seibert and Elstad, the plurality proposed the following analysis: in
277. Id. at 2620 (quoting Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 316 (1985)).
278. Id. Justice O'Connor notes that similar police tactics have been relevant to the issue of
whether a confession is voluntary. See id. (citing Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739 (1969)
(holding that police lies told to a suspect in order to get him to confess bear on the issue of
voluntariness); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412,422 (1986) (similar)).
279. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2619 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
280. See id. In fact, the way Justice O'Connor formulated the Elstad test makes it possible that
the result reached by courts will be the same most of the time, even in cases of deliberate use of the
two-step interrogation method, whether they apply her approach or Justice Kennedy's approach.
281. Seeid. at2618-19.
282. See, e.g., United States v. Esquilin, 208 F.3d 315, 320 (lst Cir. 2000) (rejecting the argument
that intentional Miranda violations amount to "improper tactics" under Elstad and finding the
warned statement voluntary), overruled in part by Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2601; Davis v. United States,
724 A.2d 1163, 1170 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (recognizing that police actions in the case intentionally
violated Miranda, but that under the totality of circumstances the warned statement was voluntary).
283. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2610 n.4 (plurality opinion); see also United States v. Aguilar, 384 F.3d
520, 523 (8th Cir. 2004) (commenting that Seibert limits Elstad); United States v. Stewart, 388 F.3d
1079, 1087 (7th Cir. 2004) (similar); United States v. Khan, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1185 (D. Colo.
2004) (similar).
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two-step interrogation cases, first apply the multi-factor test to determine
"whether in the circumstances the Miranda warnings given could reasonably
be found effective. 284 If the warnings were effective using the Seibert
factors, then the court can determine if the statement was voluntary under
Elstad.285 But if the warnings were not effective under the Seibert factors,
the second statement is inadmissible without reference to Elstad.286 Under
this approach, Elstad survives Seibert but is applied only if Seibert does not
require suppression.287
When to apply Elstad is perhaps more clear under Justice Kennedy's
test.288 Using that approach, courts should apply Seibert to "deliberate"
violations, and Elstad to "good-faith" violations.289 As a result, courts will
probably more commonly apply Elstad under Justice Kennedy's approach
because it may prove hard to consistently prove "deliberate" officer intent.29 °
B. Interpreting the Case: A Survey of Seibert's Impact on Lower Courts
When the Supreme Court decides a case and "no single rationale
explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the holding of the
court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who
concurred in the judgment on the narrowest grounds.' 29' Because Seibert
failed to produce a majority, its impact will depend on how courts construe
the narrowest grounds for its holding.292 Justice Kennedy himself regards
his approach as narrower, and because it applies only in the case of
intentional Miranda violations, he is likely correct.293 Many courts that have
applied Seibert agree, typically explaining that his approach is narrower
because it merely requires an inquiry into officer intent and curative
measures as opposed to a potentially unwieldy multi-factor test.294 Since
Justice Kennedy's approach is narrower than the one taken by the plurality,




288. See supra Part III.D.
289. See Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2616 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
290. See supra notes 257-64 for Justice O'Connor's criticism of an intent-based test.
291. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153
n. 15 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, & Stevens, JJ.)).
292. See id.
293. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2616 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (explaining that the plurality's test
"envisions an objective inquiry from the perspective of the suspect, and applies in the case of both
intentional and unintentional two-stage interrogations" a test that in his view "cuts too broadly").
294. See, e.g., Callihan v. Kentucky, 142 S.W.3d 123, 126 (Ky. 2004); see infra Part IV.B.2.
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his view is the holding of the Court for purposes of applying Seibert to
subsequent cases.295
It is interesting to note that Justice Kennedy's approach is narrower even
though his test requires an inquiry into officer intent, something additional
that the plurality approach does not require.296 In addition, the fact that
Kennedy's approach is narrower leads to a somewhat unusual and
anomalous result: the holding of the Court is the position taken by only one
Justice, with whom every other member of the High Court (except Justice
Breyer) disagrees.
Many lower courts have not recognized, or at least not discussed, the
narrowest-grounds issue in Seibert. In fact, when faced with a Seibert-type
issue, some courts have simply applied the plurality's rule and multi-factor
test without much discussion of Justice Kennedy's concurrence.297 Others
appear to have erred on the safe side and have given nearly equal treatment
to both tests.298 Still other courts have correctly held Justice Kennedy's
intent-based test to be the proper approach and have emphasized it while
also attempting to address the goals of the plurality approach as well. 99
1. Cases Primarily Applying the Plurality's Test
In analyzing Seibert, several courts have applied the plurality's factors
without discussing the narrowest-grounds issue or giving much weight to
Justice Kennedy's test. One case that exemplifies this approach is United
States v. Hernandez-Hernandez 300 where the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals applied the plurality's test in distinguishing its case from Seibert.30 1
Without mentioning the narrowest-grounds issue, this court cited Justice
Kennedy's opinion when it concluded that there was no deliberate Miranda
violation. °2 Despite the isolated citation to his opinion, the court failed to
identify or apply the second part of Justice Kennedy's test by examining
295. See Marks, 430 U.S. 188 at 193.
296. See Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2616 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
297. See infra Part IV.B.I. Among these, many have not even mentioned the narrowest-holding
issue.
298. See infra Part IV.B.2.
299. See infra Part IV.B.2.
300. 384 F.3d 562 (8th Cir. 2004).
301. Id. at 565-67.
302. Id. at 566 (citing Missouri v. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. 2601, 2616 (2004) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring)).
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whether the statement was voluntary.3 °3 This case also illustrates that even
within the same circuit some cases discuss Justice Kennedy's approach more
than others.3 4
Similarly, in United States v. Renken, 30 5 a federal district court applied
the plurality's test while only paying lip service to Justice Kennedy's
approach. 3 6 Along the way, this court referred to the plurality's test as the
holding of "the Court" on numerous occasions and never addressed the fact
that Seibert failed to produce a majority approach. 3 7 Apparently blinded,
this court actually claimed that Seibert "set forth clear guidelines governing
the admissibility of a confession elicited through use of question-first
[techniques]" while ignoring the narrowest-grounds issue.30 8 And in this
case, applying the proper analysis may have led to a different result. There
was no evidence that this case involved an intentional Miranda violation,
which is not determinative under the plurality approach but is under Justice
Kennedy's test.30 9 So under a strict application of Justice Kennedy's test,
the court should have applied Elstad here.3t0 To the extent that an Elstad
analysis would have yielded a different result, the court's error is arguably
not harmless.3 '
Not deterred by a lack of officer intent, as it should have been, the court
applied the Seibert plurality's factors and concluded that because the second
round of questioning was continuous with the first, the second confession
had to be suppressed.3 12 The only mention of Justice Kennedy's test is
buried in a footnote where the court makes the perplexing comment that
303. See id. Recall that when there is no "deliberate" Miranda violation, Justice Kennedy would
apply the Elstad voluntariness test. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2616 (Kennedy, J., concurring). The Court
simply did not do that here.
304. Compare Hernandez-Hernandez with United States v. Briones, 390 F.3d 610 (8th Cir. 2004),
discussed infra in Part IV.13.2.
305. No. 02 CR 1099, 2004 WL 2005833 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 26, 2004).
306. Id. at *4.
307. Id. at *1-*4. The Court simply applied the plurality's test without a discussion of the
narrowest grounds for its holding as required by Marks v. United States, 379 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir.
2004). See Renkin, 2004 WL 2005833, at *1-*4.
308. Renkin, 2004 WL 2005833, at *2.
309. See supra Parts IlI.C, III.D.
310. See supra Part III.D.
311. Note that a confession is more likely to be admitted under the Elstad standard, which only
requires that the statements be made voluntarily. One possible explanation for this court's failure to
apply Justice Kennedy's test here is that its application likely would have resulted in admitting the
confession, a result the court was uncomfortable with.
312. Renken, 2004 WL 2005833, at *4 ("[A]s in Seibert, the circumstances indicate that 'it would
have been reasonable to regard the two sessions as part of a continuum."'). Although the plurality's
factors are arguably vague, this court applied them with relative ease. See id. at *4; supra notes 170-
77 and accompanying text. In that respect, this case is representative of virtually all cases applying
Seibert. No court to date has yet vocalized its dissatisfaction with the factors.
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there was no evidence that any curative measures were taken.313 This was an
apparent attempt to meet Justice Kennedy's test. 314 This footnote is
nonsensical because once the court concluded that there was no "deliberate"
violation, the issue of curative measures is moot under Justice Kennedy's
test.31 5
These two cases are not alone in their decision to focus on the plurality
test.316 In particular, courts that have only briefly mentioned Seibert in order
to distinguish it have been more likely to only discuss the plurality
opinion.317 Similarly, in United States v. Khan318 a federal district court in
Colorado held that it was "not persuaded that Khan's statements ... were
made voluntarily" because of the coercive atmosphere created by the FBI
agents. 319 But the court went on to hold that even if the statements were
voluntary, the Seibert plurality test would require suppression of the
statements because the government failed to establish that the mid-
interrogation Miranda warnings "could have served their purpose., 320 Khan
does not mention Justice Kennedy's opinion at all or its test, but this may be
more excusable since the case was decided on other grounds.321
313. Renken, 2004 WL 2005833, at *4 n.6.
314. Id.
315. See Missouri v. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. 2601, 2616 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
316. See, e.g., United States v. Price, No. 04-40035-SAC, 2004 WL 2457858, at *3-4 (D. Kan.
Oct. 22, 2004) (applying the plurality's factors and implicitly rejecting Justice Kennedy's approach
by saying "[t]he appropriate analysis as to admissibility of the post-Miranda statements is not
whether the officer acted in good faith"); Crawford v. State, 100 P.3d 440, 450 (Alaska Ct. App.
2004) ("Employing the analysis adopted by the plurality in Seibert, we conclude that this midstream
administration of Miranda warnings [was not] effective[]."). In Crawford, the court also held that
the warned confession was involuntary under Elstad, so applying Justice Kennedy's approach likely
would not have changed the result. Crawford, 100 P.3d at 450. However, the court did not even go
so far as to mention that approach. See id.
317. See Reinert v. Larkins, 379 F.3d 76, 91 (3d Cir. 2004) (discussing only the plurality's test
before finding the case indistinguishable from Elstad); United States v. Wilson, No. 04-CR-88-C,
2004 WL 1946409, at *4-5 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 30, 2004) (similar); see also State v. Starcher, No.
2004CA00025, 2004 WL 2955219 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2004) (discussing only the plurality
approach in a case where the court found Seibert inapplicable because the defendant did not
implicate herself during the pre-warning interrogation). However, at least one court that quickly
distinguished Seibert implicitly considered Justice Kennedy's test. In United States v. Libby, No.
CRIM.04-26-B-W, 2004 WL 1701042, at *6 (D. Me. July 30, 2004), a federal district court in Maine
applied the plurality's factors but further emphasized that the deliberate two-step interrogation
technique employed in Seibert was absent from its case.
318. 324 F. Supp. 2d 1177 (D. Colo. 2004).
319. Id. at 1189-90.
320. Id. at 1190.
321. See id. Apparently the court did not give as much attention to these issues because it found
the statements to be involuntary.
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2. Cases that have Applied Both the Seibert Plurality Approach and
Justice Kennedy's Approach
Several methods have emerged among courts applying both tests,
reflecting a varying quality of analysis. Representative of one type of case is
United States v. Aguilar, 22 where a Colorado district court emphasized the
plurality test but also mentioned that the Kennedy concerns were met.323
After applying the plurality's factors and holding that the "Miranda
warnings... did not serve the[ir] purpose," the court acknowledged, almost
as an afterthought, that Justice Kennedy's test was narrower. 324 But the
court concluded that this case also satisfied Justice Kennedy's test because
"the method and timing of the two interrogations establish intentional,
calculated conduct by the police" and no curative measures were taken.325
Other courts have emphasized Justice Kennedy's approach while
applying the plurality test secondarily. For example, in United States v.
Briones,326 the Eighth Circuit recognized that "[b]ecause Justice Kennedy
relied on grounds narrower than those of the plurality, his opinion is of
special significance. 3 27 Finding no evidence of a "deliberate" Miranda
violation, the court properly considered whether the statements were
voluntarily made under Elstad.328 Relegating the plurality test to a footnote,
the court added "[the suspect's] statements would also be admissible under
the multifactor test fashioned by the Seibert plurality. '329 This case correctly
applies Justice Kennedy's test, and demonstrates how the Eighth Circuit has
altered its analysis since Hernandez-Hernandez decided two months
earlier.33 °
Still others seemed to have stumbled upon the correct result despite an
utter failure to correctly apply Seibert. The most interesting such case is In
322. 384 F.3d 520 (8th Cir. 2004).
323. See id. at 523-26.
324. Id. at 525.
325. Id.
326. 390 F.3d 610 (8th Cir. 2004).
327. Id. at 613 (citing Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 9 (1994); Marks v. United States, 430
U.S. 188, 193 (1977)).
328. Id. at 614.
329. Id. at614n.3.
330. Compare United States v. Hernandez-Hemandez, 384 F.3d 562 (8th Cir. 2004) (applying the
plurality test), with Briones, 390 F.3d at 613-14 (applying Justice Kennedy's test). Notably, Judge
Heaney participated in both cases. See Hernandez-Hernandez, 384 F.3d at 563; Briones, 390 F.3d at
611. One state court case that is similar to Briones is Callihan v. Commonwealth, 142 S.W.3d 123,
126 (Ky. 2004). In Callihan, the Kentucky Supreme Court mentioned both tests before concluding,
without much discussion, that "the narrowest grounds are those set forth in Justice Kennedy's
concurring opinion." Id. at 126. Because the record was devoid of any finding of intent, that court
would have remanded for a hearing on that issue if it had not disposed of the case on other grounds.
See id. at 126, 128. Because the court ultimately decided the case on other grounds, the narrowest-
grounds discussion is dicta.
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re WJ.L.331 where an Ohio appellate court attempted to distinguish Seibert
by applying only the plurality factors of its choice.332 In its analysis, the
court did not even mention two of the five factors announced by the Seibert
plurality, namely the completeness of the first round of questioning and the
overlapping content of the questions.333 Nonetheless, the court held this case
distinguishable from Seibert because the factors it applied led it to the
conclusion that no intentional Miranda violation had occurred.334 Even
more perplexing, the court immediately went on to conclude that "[s]imply
put, under the totality of the circumstances, there was no reason to believe
that Lyon's second statement was not voluntarily made., 335 This conclusion
completely ignores the Seibert plurality test, which the court purported to
apply, and implicitly applies the Elstad test.33 6 Although the Ohio court in
this case discussed some of the plurality's factors, it ultimately failed to
apply that test as the other cases have done. 337 However, even though the
court fails to mention Justice Kennedy's test at all, it reached the result that
test requires. Because there was no evidence of an intentional Miranda
violation, Justice Kennedy would apply the Elstad voluntariness test, which
in effect is what this court did.338
331. No. 2003 CA 81, 2004 WL 1588090 (Ohio Ct. App. July 16, 2004).
332. Id. at *2. In applying some of the factors, the court found that the interrogations were in
different places and conducted by different people, and that at least fifteen minutes elapsed between
the interrogations so the sessions were not continuous. Id. Note that the fifteen minutes between
interrogations was actually shorter than the twenty minute break given in Seibert, which logically
weighs in favor of finding the second confession continuous with the first.
333. Id. The court noted only that the first interview was "short." Id.
334. Id. This test would satisfy Justice Breyer's proposed test and Justice Kennedy's test, but
officer intent is not the focus of the plurality's analysis.
335. Id. at *2.
336. See supra notes 52-55 for a discussion of the Elstad test. This part of the opinion is
defensible only if the court first reached the conclusion that the plurality test was satisfied and then
went on to hold that the statement was voluntary. The plurality actually endorsed this kind of
analysis. See supra notes 284-87 and accompanying text. But if the court was applying such an
approach, it did not do so clearly. See In re W.J.L., 2004 WL 1588090, at *2 (discussing Seibert
factors and concluding in the same paragraph that "[s]imply put, under the totality of the
circumstances, there was no reason to believe that Lyon's second statement was not voluntarily
made").
337. See, e.g., United States v. Renken, No. 02 CR 1099, 2004 WL 2005833, at *3 (N.D. II. Aug.
26, 2004) (interpreting the ultimate question under Seibert to be "whether it would be reasonable to
find that in these circumstances the warnings could function 'effectively' as Miranda requires"
(citing Missouri v. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. 2601, 1610 (2004))). The decision to give such little credence
to Seibert does not seem to be influenced by the court's desire to admit the confession, because
under the formulation of Seibert described above the second confession would probably have been
admissible.
338. Seelnre W.J.L.,2004WL 1588090, at *2.
A final category of cases cogently and creatively tries to interpret
Seibert and apply the proper test to the facts. In United States v. Stewart,
339
the Seventh Circuit examined in some detail both the plurality and Kennedy
approaches and held that intentional use of the question-first tactic creates a
presumption that the warned statement be excluded.340 But in its view, that
presumption could be overcome by a showing that in applying the plurality's
multi-factor test, the Miranda warnings were "effective" as given.34' The
court went on to note that Justice Kennedy cast the deciding vote "to depart
from Elstad, but only where the police set out deliberately to withhold
Miranda warnings., 342 As a result, if the Miranda violation was not the
result of a deliberate question-first strategy, Elstad should apply.
343
The Seventh Circuit's analysis in Stewart gives credence to both the
plurality and Kennedy approaches but highlights the unfortunate result that
courts will have to determine officer intent in successive interrogation cases,
an analysis that was rejected by at least seven Justices. 3" A federal district
court in Pennsylvania took a similar approach in United States v. Kiam3 45 by
synthesizing the relevant opinions in Seibert into a three-step analysis.
346
The first step comes from Justice Kennedy's test: determine whether police
deliberately used the question-first technique. 347 Then apply the plurality's
five-factor test to determine if the case is more like Seibert or Elstad.3 4' And
lastly, if the court finds the case more like Seibert, it should determine if
sufficient curative measures were taken. 349 Apparently, the court adopted
this approach because it was bound by precedent, but it questioned the
wisdom of an intent-based test.350
This approach is similar to the approach of the Seventh Circuit in
Stewart, with the additional requirement that curative measures must be
taken.351' Because the curative measures analysis is similar in effect to the
plurality's multi-factor test, the circuit court seemed to indicate that they
339. 388 F.3d 1079 (7th Cir. 2004).




344. See id. The fact that the Seventh Circuit had to remand the case for a hearing on the issue of
officer intent demonstrates why the intent-based analysis is disfavored. See id. at 1091-92.
345. 343 F. Supp. 2d 398 (E.D. Pa. 2004).
346. Id. at 408-09.
347. Id. at 408.
348. Id. at 409.
349. Id.
350. See id. at 409 n.16 (noting that the "subjective dimension" of Justice Kennedy's test is a
"dimension the jurisprudence has wisely sought to avoid").
351. See id. at 409.
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overlapped.352 These courts have taken somewhat different approaches to
interpreting Seibert, but in practice their approaches will likely operate in
much the same way. While neither court's approach may be perfect, these
courts should be commended for first recognizing the plurality opinion
issue, and second, for their creative attempts to reconcile and integrate
Justice Kennedy's test with the plurality approach. And at least one thing is
certain: courts must apply Justice Kennedy's narrower test in some form,
and courts that have failed to do so have undoubtedly misconstrued
Seibert.
313
C. Impact on Law Enforcement
Exactly how many law enforcement agencies are effected by Seibert is
unclear. For agencies and departments not using the question-first technique
this decision will have little effect, since it targets only intentional violations
of Miranda. 3 Of course, agencies that made it policy to utilize the
question-first technique will have to change their procedures. 5' The number
of agencies advocating and employing this technique is debatable. The
Seibert plurality concluded that use of the question-first technique is
widespread.35 6 However, the cases and articles cited by the plurality to reach
that conclusion primarily document the prevalence of police misconduct in
general, and do not even mention the question-first technique.357 As a result,
its conclusion is at least somewhat uncertain and it is impossible to know
exactly how sweeping the effects of Seibert will be.
Even for agencies using the question-first technique, Seibert may not
spell the death knell for all question-first type tactics. Justice Kennedy's test
saddles courts with the difficult task of finding that an officer deliberately
violated Miranda.355 If intent cannot be established, as will presumably be
352. See United States v. Stewart, 388 F.3d 1079, 1090 (7th Cir. 2004).
353. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).
354. See supra Part IV.C.
355. In cases where use of the technique is policy, it should be relatively easy to prove the
intentional nature of the violation.
356. See Missouri v. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. 2601, 2608-09 (2004).
357. See id. at 2608-09 & nn.2-3. The plurality does list several cases where police employed the
technique. Id. But because that list only includes five cases, four of which represent the split in the
circuits, it does not support the conclusion that the practice is widespread. See id. The plurality also
cites to police manuals and training tools that purport to use the technique, and while this shows that
some police departments are using the technique, it fails to convince that the technique is actually
widespread. See id.
358. There is an apparently fine line between an intentional violation and a mere omission of the
warnings.
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the case quite often, the Elstad voluntariness rule will govern.35 9 And over
the past nineteen years, courts have typically been reluctant to find
statements made after Miranda warnings to be involuntary.36 °
Courts applying the plurality's test in some capacity essentially have a
judgment call over whether the Miranda warnings could have been effective
as given.361 As a result, the plurality's arguably vague factors will provide
courts a way to distinguish Seibert, if they are so inclined. This is where the
vagueness of the factors could pose a problem for courts and an opportunity
for law enforcement. For example, if the unwamed questioning is not
particularly detailed, 362 occurs in a different location than the warned
statement,363 is performed by different officers, and there is a break of more
than twenty minutes, the door is open for a court to distinguish Seibert.36
One could imagine that the situation just described might be very different
from Seibert, especially from the perspective of an overwhelmed suspect.
D. Effect on Patrice Seibert: Conviction Overturned
The most direct result of the Court's decision in Seibert was that Patrice
Seibert's warned confession was suppressed.365 In so holding, the Court
affirmed the decision of the Missouri Supreme Court to overturn her
conviction, and she cannot be retried with the benefit of either of her
confessions.366 So this admitted murderer is perhaps, for now, the greatest
beneficiary of the Court's decision.
V. CONCLUSION
Missouri v. Seibert was challenging for the Court partly because of the
obvious conflict between the interests of law enforcement and protection of
suspects' rights, and even more importantly because a majority of the Court
wanted to repudiate the question-first technique without fashioning a test
based on either officer intent or the fruit of the poisonous tree analysis.
367
Reflecting this difficulty, none of the approaches voiced by members of
the Court in Seibert is without its flaws. Although the plurality wisely
avoids an intent-based approach, it would have courts apply an amorphous
359. See Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2616 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
360. See supra Part II.C.
361. See Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2610 (plurality opinion).
362. For example, a to-the-point-question of guilt or innocence.
363. Perhaps in a police car on the way to the station.
364. The result is that the court will likely apply Elstad, whose voluntariness test is much harder
for a suspect to meet. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
365. See Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2613 (plurality opinion).
366. Id.
367. Id. at 2610 n.4, 2612.
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test that requires examination of ill-defined factors to determine whether
Miranda warnings could be "effective" as given. 368 That test seems to
provide lower courts with little real guidance and gives judges discretion to
impose their will in determining whether a case is similar enough to Seibert
to suppress a statement. 369 Whether or not this concern manifests itself
remains to be seen as early cases have not recognized this shortcoming.370
Justice Kennedy's approach is problematic because it requires courts to
determine the intent of police officers, which both the plurality and the
dissent agree would be impossible in many cases. 37 1 Meanwhile, Justice
Breyer briefly proposed an approach that has already been rejected by the
Court in Elstad.372 Perhaps the best approach is the one taken by the
dissenting Justices who would simply apply precedent and admit the second
statement if voluntarily made.373 The primary difficulty with this approach
is that it does not appear to firmly reject the troubling and apparently
widespread question-first technique.374 To the extent that the dissenters
would allow a finding that a warned confession (such as the one in Seibert)
could be involuntary simply because the question-first technique is used, it
might be the best approach.
Aside from the arguments for and against the tests described above,
lower courts have struggled to interpret the proper test to take from
Seibert. 171 Some courts have completely disregarded, or too quickly
dismissed, Justice Kennedy's approach, which courts are now recognizing
contains the narrowest test and is thus the holding of the Court.376 But cases
such as Kiam wisely apply the Kennedy test and integrate the plurality
factors as well.377 Perhaps the best approach is the one taken by the Seventh
Circuit in Stewart: if police deliberately violate Miranda by seeking a
confession before warning, a presumption attaches that a later, warned
statement be excluded unless rebutted by evidence that the Miranda
warnings were nonetheless effective under the plurality's test.
378
368. See id. at 2610-12.
369. See supra Part III.C.9.
370. See supra Part IV.B.
371. See Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2617-18 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also supra Part II.D
(discussing Justice Kennedy's opinion).
372. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2613-14 (Breyer, J., concurring).
373. See id. at 2619 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
374. See supra Part III.F.
375. See supra Part IV.B.
376. See supra Part IV.B.I.
377. See United States v. Kiam, 343 F. Supp. 2d 398, 409-10 (E.D. Pa. 2004).
378. See United States v. Stewart, 388 F.3d 1079, 1089 (7th Cir. 2004).
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Whatever the approach, courts that refuse to apply Justice Kennedy's
intent-based test are ignoring stare decisis, and in cases where officer intent
cannot be established,379 this mistake may affect the result and courts will
not be shielded by the protection of harmless error. Amidst the lower court
chaos, at least one thing seems clear: if a court can establish that the
question-first technique was intentionally used to "circumvent Miranda," it
will suppress the post-warning statement. And at the end of the day, this
should signal an end to the question-first tactic, a result that a majority of the
Court intended.380 But critics will correctly point out that this is true only to
the extent that officer intent can be discovered by the court, which is a
difficult proposition.38'
APPENDIX A
Excerpts from Seibert's interrogation that took place after Miranda
warnings were given.382
[Officer] Hanrahan: "Now, in discussion you told us, you told us
that there was a[n] understanding about Donald."
Seibert: "Yes."
Hanrahan: "Did that take place earlier that morning?"
Seibert: "Yes."
Hanrahan: "And what was the understanding about Donald?"
Seibert: "If they could get him out of the trailer, to take him out of
the trailer."
Hanrahan: "And if they couldn't?"
379. This will be the case much of the time, according to the plurality and dissent. See Seibert,
124 S. Ct. at 2617-18 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
380. See Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2612 (plurality opinion); id. at 2616 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
381. See id. at 2618 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
382. Id. at 2606 (plurality opinion) (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added).
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Seibert: "I, I never even thought about it. I just figured they
would."
Hanrahan: " 'Trice, didn 't you tell me that he was supposed to die in
his sleep?"
Seibert: "If that would happen, 'cause he was on that new medicine,
you know...."
Hanrahan: "The Prozac? And it
supposed to die in his sleep?"
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